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Abstract—Cascading failures in power systems exhibit non-
local propagation patterns which make the analysis and mitiga-
tion of failures difficult. In this work, we propose a distributed
control framework inspired by the recently proposed concepts
of unified controller and network tree-partition that offers strong
guarantees in both the mitigation and localization of cascading
failures in power systems. In this framework, the transmission
network is partitioned into several control areas which are
connected in a tree structure, and the unified controller is
adopted by generators or controllable loads for fast timescale
disturbance response. After an initial failure, the proposed
strategy always prevents successive failures from happening,
and regulates the system to the desired steady state where the
impact of initial failures are localized as much as possible. For
extreme failures that cannot be localized, the proposed frame-
work has a configurable design, that progressively involves and
coordinates more control areas for failure mitigation and, as
a last resort, imposes minimal load shedding. We compare
the proposed control framework with Automatic Generation
Control (AGC) on the IEEE 118-bus test system. Simulation
results show that our novel framework greatly improves the
system robustness in terms of the N −1 security standard, and
localizes the impact of initial failures in majority of the load
profiles that are examined. Moreover, the proposed framework
incurs significantly less load loss, if any, compared to AGC, in
all of our case studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cascading failures in power systems propagate non-
locally, making their analysis and mitigation difficult. This
fact is illustrated by the sequence of events leading to
the 1996 Western US blackout summarized in Fig. 1, in
which successive failures happened hundreds of kilometers
away from each other (e.g. from stage 3 to stage 4 and
from stage 7 to stage 8 ). Non-local propagation makes it
particularly challenging to design distributed controllers that
reliably prevent and mitigate cascades in power systems. In
fact, such control is widely considered impossible, even when
centralized coordination is available [1], [2].
Current industry practice for mitigating cascading fail-
ures mostly relies on simulation-based contingency analysis,
which focuses on a small set of most likely initial failures [3].
Moreover, the size of the contingency set which is tested (and
thus the level of security guaranteed) is often constrained
by computational power, undermining its effectiveness in
view of the enormous number of components in power
networks. After a blackout event, a detailed study typically
leads to a redesign of such contingency sets, potentially
together with physical network upgrades and revision of
system management policies and regulations [2].
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Fig. 1. The sequence of events, indexed by the circled numbers, that lead
to the Western US blackout in 1996. Adopted from [17].
The limitations of current practice have motivated a large
body of literature to study and characterize analytical prop-
erties of cascading failures in power systems. This literature
can be roughly categorized as follows: (a) applying Monte-
Carlo methods to analytical models that account for the
steady state power redistribution using DC [4]–[7] or AC [8]–
[10] flow models; (b) studying pure topological models built
upon simplifying assumptions on the propagation dynamics
(e.g., failures propagate to adjacent lines with high proba-
bility) and inferring component failure propagation patterns
from graph-theoretic properties [11]–[13]; (c) investigating
simplified or statistical cascading failure dynamics [14]–[17].
In all these approaches, the non-local failure propagation
often creates significant challenges when trying to make
general inferences about failure patterns.
A new approach to address such challenges has emerged
in recent years, aiming to improve the system resilience
by partitioning the power network into smaller regions and
localizing impacts of line failures within each region [18],
[19]. This approach is based on the tree-partition of power
grids (see Section III-A for its definition and properties)
and yields many interesting, sometimes counter-intuitive,
insights for the planning and management of power systems.
For instance, the case studies in [19] show that, by prop-
erly reducing system redundancy, one can improve system
robustness against component failures – the existence of
redundancy turns out to play a prominent role in the non-
local nature of failure propagation in power systems.
Unfortunately, this literature has yet to yield a fully
satisfactory solution for mitigating and localizing failures,
due to two main challenges. First, reducing redundancy as
suggested in [18], [19] may lead to single-point vulnera-
bilities, whose failure has a global impact on the whole
system and can potentially cause significant load loss. Sec-
ond, information on unfolding cascading failures are not fed
back into relevant controllers that could adjust the network
topology (and in particular its tree-partition). Therefore, after
an initial failure is triggered, the strategy described in [19]
guarantees that any successive failure will occur in the same
region as the initial failure, but does not prevent or stop
successive failures from happening in the first place. To
overcome these drawbacks, there is need for new control
designs that can “close the loop” and respond actively and
promptly to different failures.
Contributions of this paper: We propose a distributed
control strategy that operates on the frequency regulation
timescale and offers proveable failure mitigation properties
and localization guarantees. To the best of our knowledge,
this control paradigm is the first to leverage results from the
frequency regulation literature in the context of cascading
failures, bringing new perspectives and insights to both
literatures. Our control scheme guarantees that failures do
not propagate whenever there is a feasible way to avoid it
(see Section III on the rigorous definition of such feasibility),
and the impact of failures are localized as much as possible
in a manner configurable by the system operator.
We introduce the main idea of our control design in Sec-
tion IV, whose failure mitigation and localization guarantees
are established by the technical results in Section V and VI.
The key piece of our control builds upon the so-called Uni-
fied Controller (UC), a noval design approach to frequency
regulation [20]–[23]. Our design revolves around the new and
powerful properties that emerge when the regions that UC
manages form a tree-partition. More specifically, in Section
V, we characterize how UC responds to an initial failure
when it operates over a tree-partition, and prove that a non-
critical failure is always mitigated and localized. Later, in
Section VI, we discuss how the tree-partition enables the
system operator to explicitly specify the unfolding pattern
of critical failures, and prove that UC can be extended to
detect such scenarios as part of its normal operation.
In order to establish these results, we make use of the
correspondence between swing/power flow dynamics and
primal-dual algorithms to solve certain optimal dispatch
problems, as developed in [20], [22], [24]. Further, we
prove new results on the UC optimization problem using
novel algebraic characterizations of DC power flow equations
derived from graph-theoretic properties of tree-partitions.
Lastly, we apply the classical results from convex analysis
and optimization theory to show that critical failures can
always be detected by UC in a distributed fashion.
In Section VII, we compare the proposed control strategy
with classical Automatic Generation Control (AGC) using
the IEEE 118-bus test system. We demonstrate that by
switching off only a small subset of transmission lines
and adopting UC as the fast timescale controller, one can
significantly improve the system robustness to failures in
terms of the N−1 security standard. Moreover, in a majority
of the load profiles that are examined, our control strategy
further localizes the impact of initial failures to the regions
where they occur, leaving the operating points of all other
control areas unchanged. Lastly, we highlight that when
load shedding is inevitable, the proposed framework incurs
significantly less load loss compared to AGC, in all of our
case studies.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present our power system model,
describe the failure propagation process thus derived, and
discuss how they are related to previous models in literature.
TABLE I
VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH BUSES AND TRANSMISSION LINES.
θ := (θj , j ∈ N ) bus voltage angle deviations
ω := (ωj , j ∈ N ) bus frequency deviations
r := (rj , j ∈ N ) injection deviations
d := (dj , j ∈ N )
mechanical power injection adjustment for
generator buses; controllable load adjust-
ment for load buses
dj , dj , j ∈ N
upper and lower limits for the adjustable
injection dj
Djωj , j ∈ N frequency sensitive generator/load dynamics
f := (fe, e ∈ E) branch flow deviations
fe, fe
, e ∈ E upper and lower limits for branch flow de-
viations
C ∈ R|N|×|E|
incidence matrix of G: Cje = 1 if j is
the source of e, Cje = −1 if j is the
destination of e, and Cje = 0 otherwise
B := diag(Be, e ∈ E)
branch flow linearization coefficients that
depend on nominal state voltage magnitudes
and reference phase angles
A. Power Grid Model and Fast Timescale Dynamics
We consider a power transmission network described by
the graph G = (N , E), where N = {1, . . . , |N |} is the set of
buses and E ⊂ N ×N is the set of transmission lines. The
terms bus/node and line/edge will be used interchangeably in
the rest of the paper. An edge in E between nodes i and j is
denoted either as e or (i, j). We assign a fixed but arbitrary
orientation to the edges in E , so that if (i, j) ∈ E then
(j, i) /∈ E . Together with the variables associated with buses
and transmission lines from Table I, the linearized swing and
power flow dynamics can be written as
Mjω˙j = rj − dj −Djωj −
∑
e∈E
Cjefe, j ∈ N (1a)
f˙ij = Bij(ωi − ωj), (i, j) ∈ E (1b)
We refer the readers to [20], [22] for more detailed justifi-
cation and derivation of this model.
Definition 1. A state x∗ := (ω∗, d∗, f∗) ∈ R2|N |+|E| is said
to be an equilibrium of (1) if the right hand sides of (1)
are zero at x∗.
We emphasize that the dj ’s in (1a) usually depend on the
system states and may evolve by themselves in accordance to
certain controller specific dynamics. The equilibrium defined
above refers to the closed-loop equilibrium. It is thus possible
to engineer the equilibrium of (1) by adopting a different
controller design for dj , which in turn impacts how failures
propagate in the system.
B. Failure Occurrence and Propagation
In full generality, the control strategy that we introduce
later applies to both generator failures and line failures.
However, to simplify the presentation, in this paper we focus
only on line failures as the generalization to bus failures is
straightforward.1
We describe the cascading failure process by keeping track
of the set of failed lines at each stage, which are naturally
nested and expanding as the stages progress. Overloaded
lines are tripped at slower timescales than the dynamics
1Our results readily apply to cases where the failure of a generator
or substation can be emulated by the simultaneous failures of all the
transmission lines connected to the corresponding bus.
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the failure propagation model.
(1); the cascade stages reflect this fact and, indeed, at each
stage we assume the system reaches the new steady state
equilibrium. The crux of our failure propagation model lies
in the interplay between such slow timescale line tripping
process and the fast timescale dynamics on system transient
behavior described by (1), as illustrated in Fig. 2.
More specifically, each stage n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} corre-
sponds to a topology G(n) := (N , E\B(n)) in the failure
unfolding process, where B(n) is the set of all tripped lines
at stage n. Within stage n, the system evolves according
to the dynamics (1) on the topology G(n), and converges
to an equilibrium point x∗(n) = (ω∗(n), d∗(n), f∗(n)) that
depends on G(n). If all the branch flows f∗(n) are below
the corresponding line ratings at equilibrium, then x∗(n) is a
secure operating point and the cascade stops. Otherwise, let
F(n) be the subset of lines whose branch flow exceeds the
corresponding line ratings. The lines in F(n) operate above
their safety limits in steady state, so by the end of stage n
they are overheated and tripped, i.e., B(n+1) = B(n)∪F(n).
Line overloads during the transient phase before the system
converges to x∗(n) are considered to be tolerable because the
transient dynamics in (1) are not long enough to overheat
a line [22] (lasting only seconds to a few minutes). This
process repeats for stage n+ 1 and so on.
C. Recovering Previous Models
Our failure propagation model brings new perspectives
to the commonly studied models in literature, and reveals
interesting insights on how certain limitations from previous
work can be circumvented. In particular, the extra freedom
in choosing dj in the fast timescale dynamics (1) allows us
to design and improve how the system reacts to line failures;
thus achieving failure mitigation objectives directly using
the well-known analytical tools from frequency regulation
literature.
As a first example, we show that adopting the classical
droop control [25] in our framework recovers cascading
failure models from previous literature such as [6], [18], [19],
[26]. Indeed, as shown in [22], the closed-loop equilibrium
of (1) under droop control is the unique2 optimal solution to
the following optimization:
min
ω,d,f,θ
∑
j∈N
d2j
2Kj
+
Djw
2
j
2
(2a)
s.t. r − d−Dω = Cf (2b)
f −BCT θ = 0 (2c)
dj ≤ d ≤ dj , j ∈ N , (2d)
where Kj’s are the generators’ participation factors [25]. By
plugging (2c) into (2b), it is routine to check that any feasible
2Such uniqueness is up to a constant shift of all phase angles θ. See [22].
point x = (ω, d, f, θ) of (2) satisifes
∑
j rj =
∑
j(dj +
Djωj). As a result, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies
that(∑
j∈N
rj
)2
=
[∑
j∈N
(dj +Djωj)
]2
≤
∑
j∈N
(
d2j
2Kj
+
Djω
2
j
2
)∑
j∈N
(2Kj + 2Dj) ,
and equality holds if and only if
dj =
Kj∑
j (Kj +Dj)
∑
j
rj , ωj =
∑
j rj∑
j (Kj +Dj)
. (3)
Therefore, if the control limits (2d) are not active, (3) is
always satisfied at the optimal point x∗ = (ω∗, d∗, f∗, θ∗).
Now consider a line e being tripped from the transmission
network G, and for simplicity assume the control limits (2d)
are not active. If e is a bridge3, the tripping of e results in two
islands of G, say N1 and N2, and two optimization problems
(2) corresponding to N1 and N2 respectively. For l = 1, 2,∑
j∈Nl
rj represents the total power imbalance in Nl, and
therefore (3) implies that droop control adjusts the system
injection so that the power imbalance is distributed to all
generators proportional to their participation factors in both
N1 and N2. If e = (i, j) is not a bridge, denoting the original
flow on e before it is tripped as fe, then ri = fe, rj = −fe
and rk = 0 otherwise. As a result, we have
∑
j∈N rj = 0
in this case and thus (3) implies the system operating point
remains unchanged. This control recovers exactly the failure
propagation dynamics in [6], [18], [19], [26]. Moreover, one
can show that this still holds when (2d) is active with a more
involved analysis on the KKT conditions of (2).
We thus see that this droop control mechanism underlies
some of the previous results in the literature on cascading
failures in power systems. In paricular, this suggests that,
by using a different control design for dj , we can obtain
different and potentially better system behaviors after a line
failure. For instance, it is shown in [19] that bridge failures
under droop control have a global impact, while (as we
outline in Section V) the impact of bridge failures can in fact
be localized using UC. Our new proposed control strategy
leverages precisely this extra freedom in chooseing the dj ’s
to offer stronger guarantees in both failure mitigation and
localization compared to previous work [19].
III. TREE-PARTITIONS AND THE UNIFIED CONTROLLER
The tree-partition and UC have emerged recently as tools
to improve power system robustness [18], [19], [22]. These
concepts have been investigated separately in the literature as
they operate at different timescales and aim to solve different
problems. Our model brings them together into a novel
framework, which allows us to obtain new results combining
their strengths and, at the same time, provides new insights
for both. In this section, we review these concepts and
explain how they come together in this work.
A. The Tree-partition
Given a power system G = (N , E), a collection P =
{N1,N2, · · · ,Nk} of subsets ofN is said to form a partition
3A line e is said to be a bridge for G if it is a cut-edge for G, i.e., if the
removal of e from G disconnects G into two components, usually referred
to as islands in power system literature. See [27] for its rigorous definition.
Fig. 3. The construction of GP from P .
of G if Ni ∩ Nj = ∅ for i 6= j and ∪ki=1Ni = N . For
each partition P = {N1,N2, · · · ,Nk}, we can define a
reduced multi-graph GP from G as follows (see Fig. 3).
The node set of GP is in one-to-one correspondence with
{N1,N2, · · · ,Nk}, in the sense that we collapse each subset
Ni into a “super node” of GP . We then add an undirected
edge connecting the super nodes Ni and Nj for each pair of
nodes v, w ∈ N if v ∈ Ni, w ∈ Nj and they are connected
in G, i.e. (v, w) ∈ E or (w, v) ∈ E . Note that multiple edges
are added when multiple pairs of such v, w exist.
Definition 2. A partition P tree = {N1,N2, · · · ,Nk} of G
is said to form a tree-partition if the reduced multi-graph
GP tree is a tree. In this case, the subsets Nl are referred to
as tree-parition regions and the edges of G whose endpoints
belong to different regions are called bridges.
It is shown in [19] that each graph G has a unique
irreducible tree-partition, which can be computed in linear
time, and for this tree-partition, the concept of bridges
defined above coincides with that from classical graph theory
literature, such as [27]. The tree-partition of a transmission
network encodes rich information about how failures propa-
gate (under droop control, as we discussed in Section II-C).
B. The Unified Controller (UC)
UC is a control approach recently proposed in the fre-
quency regulation literature [20]–[23]. Compared to classical
droop control or Automatic Generation Control (AGC) [25],
UC aims to achieve primary frequency control, secondary
frequency control, and congestion management simultane-
ously at the frequency control timescale.
The key feature of UC that we use here is that the
closed-loop equilibrium of (1) under UC solves the following
optimization:
min
f,d,θ
∑
j∈N
cj(dj) (4a)
s.t. r − d− Cf = 0 (4b)
f = BCT θ (4c)
ECf = 0 (4d)
f
e
≤ fe ≤ fe, e ∈ E (4e)
dj ≤ dj ≤ dj , j ∈ N , (4f)
where cj(·)’s are associated cost functions that penalize
deviations from last optimal dispatch point (and hence attain
minimum at 0), (4b) guarantees power balance at each bus,
(4c) is the DC power flow equation, (4d) enforces zero area
control error [25], (4e) and (4f) are the flow and control
limits. The matrix E encodes control area information as
follows: Given a partition PUC = {N1,N2, · · · ,Nk} of
G that specifies the control areas in secondary frequency
control, E ∈ {0, 1}|P
UC|×|N|
is defined by El,j = 1 if bus j
is in region Nl and El,j = 0 otherwise. An edge e ∈ E is
called a tie-line if its endpoints belong to different regions in
PUC [22], [25]. As a result, the l-th row of ECf = 0 ensures
that the branch flow deviations on the tie-lines connected to
Nl sum to zero.
UC is designed so that its controller dynamics combined
with the system dynamics (1) form a variant of projected
primal-dual algorithms to solve (4). It is shown in [22], [23]
that when the optimization problem (4) is feasible, under
mild assumptions UC is globally stable and converges to the
optimal point of (4). This optimal point is unique (up to a
constant shift of θ) if the cost functions cj(·) are strictly
convex. We refer readers to [22], [23] for its exact controller
design and analysis.
C. Connecting UC to Tree-partition
In the previous subsections we mention two distinct par-
titions of a power network: the tree-partition P tree and the
control area partition PUC. In general, P tree and PUC can be
different. However, when they do coincide, the underlying
power grid inherits analytical properties from both tree-
partition and UC, making the system particularly robust
against failures. Our proposed control strategy leverages
this connection, as we present in more detail in Section
IV, and we henceforth assume that P tree = PUC. Under
this assumption, the bridges and the tie-lines of the power
network G also coincide.
Definition 3. Given a cascading failure process described
by B(n), n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, the set B(1) is said to be its
initial failure.
In a power system, it is reasonable to expect that different
initial failures can have different levels of impact on the
rest of the network. For instance, the disconnection of a
single solar panel from the grid is unlikely to cause any
disruption to the system operation, while the failure of a
transmission line that connects a major generator to the
grid may incur significant load shedding. We thus need to
distinguish different types of failures and ensure the proposed
control scheme reacts accordingly.
Definition 4. An initial failure B(1) is said to be critical
if the UC optimization (4) is infeasible over G(1) :=
(N , E\B(1)), or non-critical if it is not critical.
To formally state our localization result, we define the
following concept to clarify the precise meaning of a region
being “local” with respect to an initial failure.
Definition 5. Given an initial failure B(1), we say that a
tree-partition regionNl is associated with B(1) if there exists
an edge e = (i, j) ∈ B(1) such that either i ∈ Nl or j ∈ Nl.
As we discuss in Section IV, our control strategy provides
strong guarantees in mitigation and localization for both non-
critical and critical failures, in a way that only the operation
of the associated regions are adjusted whenever possible.
IV. PROPOSED CONTROL STRATEGY
Our control strategy revolves around the new and powerful
properties of the power system that emerge when the control
areas that UC operates over form a tree-partition of the
network. In this section, we outline how this strategy can
Fig. 4. Flowchart of the events after an initial failure under the proposed
control strategy.
be implemented, in both the planning phase, where a tree-
partition structure of the control areas should be created, and
the operating phase, during which UC actively monitors and
reacts to line failures. Fig. 4 illustrates the sequence of events
after an initial failure in the proposed control strategy.
A. Planning Phase: Tree-partition of Control Areas
Power networks are often comprised of multiple control
areas, each of which is managed by an independent system
operator (ISO). Although these areas exchange power with
each other as prescribed by economic dispatch, their opera-
tions are relatively independent and it is desirable to ensure
system disturbances in one area do not have a significant
impact on the others. This is usually achieved via the zero
area control error constraint in secondary frequency control
[25], and is enforced in UC with (4d). As we discuss in
Section III-C, such control areas typically do not form a tree-
partition of the transmission network, as having redundant
lines is believed to be a crucial part in maintaining N − 1
security of the power system [1], [2], [25].
In order to implement our control strategy, we propose to
create a tree-partition whose regions are precisely the control
areas over which UC operates. This can be done by switching
off a subset of the tie-lines so that the reduced multi-graph
obtained from the control area partition forms a tree. The
switching actions only need to be carried out in the planning
phase as line failures that occur during the operating phase do
not affect the tree-partition already in place4. It is interesting
to note that, when the subset of lines to switch off is chosen
carefully, this action not only helps localize the impact of
line failures, but can also improve the system reliability in
the N − 1 security sense. This seemingly counter-intuitive
phenomenon is illustrated by our case studies in Section
VII-A.
B. Operating Phase: Extending the Unified Controller
Once a tree-partition is formed, the power network un-
der UC operates as a closed-loop system and responds to
disturbances such as transmission line failure or loss of gen-
erator/load in an automonous manner. In normal conditions
where the system disturbances are insignificant, UC always
4In fact, in certain cases line failures lead to “finer” tree partitions as
more regions are potentially created when lines are removed from service.
drives the power network back to an equilibrium point that
can be interpreted as an optimal solution of (4). This is the
case, for instance, when non-critical failures (see Definition
4) happen and therefore, such failures are always properly
mitigated.
However, in extreme scenarios where a major disturbance
(e.g. a critical failure) affects the system, the optimization
problem (4) that UC aims to solve can be infeasible. In other
words, it is physically impossible for UC to achieve all of
its control objectives after such a disturbance. This causes
UC to be unstable (see Proposition 9) and, further, leads to
successive failures or even large scale outages. As such, there
is a need to extend the version of UC proposed in [22], [23]
with two features: (a) a critical failure detection component
that monitors the system states and ensures UC is aware
of such extreme situation promptly when it happens; (b) a
constraint lifting component that responds to critical failures
by proactively relaxing certain goals that UC tries to achieve,
and ensures system stability can be reached at minimal cost.
Our technical results in Section VI-A suggest a way to
implement both components as part of the normal operation
of UC. System operators can prioritize different control areas
by specifying the sequence of constraints to lift in response to
extreme events. This allows the non-associated regions to be
progressively involved and coordinated in a desired pattern
when mitigating critical failures. We present and discuss
some potential schemes in Section VI-B.
C. Guaranteed Mitigation and Localization
As we show in detail in Sections V and VI, our control
strategy provides strong guarantees in mitigation and local-
ization for both non-critical and critical failures. More specif-
ically, the proposed control strategy ensures that, (a) non-
critical failures are always fully mitigated by the associated
regions, and the operating points for non-associated regions
are not impacted at all; (b) critical failures are guaranteed to
be mitigated with certain constraints in (4) being lifted, in a
progressive manner specified by the system operator. Thus
the proposed strategy always prevents successive failures
from happening, while localizing the impact of the initial
failures as much as possible.
V. LOCALIZING NON-CRITICAL FAILURES
In this section, we consider non-critical failures, as defined
in Section III, and prove that such failures are always fully
mitigated within the associated regions.
We first characterize how the system operating point
shifts in response to such failures. Recall that if an initial
failure B(1) is non-critical, the UC optimization (4) is
feasible and thus the new system operating point x∗(1) :=
(ω∗(1), d∗(1), f∗(1), θ∗(1))5 under UC control satisfies all
the constraints in (4). In particular, none of the line limits
in (4e) is violated at x∗(1), i.e. x∗(1) is a secure operating
point and the cascade stops, namely F(1) = ∅.
Lemma 6. Given a non-critical initial failure B(1), the new
operating point x∗(1) prescribed by the UC satisfies f∗e (1) =
0 for every bridge e.
The above lemma shows that, in addition to the zero
area control error constraints enforced by (4d), when the
control areas that UC operates over form a tree-partition,
5We add θ to the state space of (1) when the phase angle is relevant.
UC further guarantees zero flow deviations on all tie-lines.
This demonstrates how a tree-partition enables UC to achieve
a stronger performance guarantee compared to its original
form as proposed in [22], [23]. The following proposition
is another result of this type, which clarifies how the tree-
partition brings localization properties to UC.
Proposition 7. Assume cj(·) is strictly convex for all j ∈ N .
Given a non-critical initial failure B(1), if a tree-partition
region Nl is not associated with B(1), then d∗j (1) = 0 for
all j ∈ Nl.
The core idea underlying the proof of this proposition
is easy to explain: Lemma 6 implies the tie-line flows,
which are the only coupling among the regions, are zero;
thus the UC optimization (4) over different regions are
totally “separated” and hence, the operating points for non-
associated regions should remain unchanged. A rigorous
proof is, however, more involved and requires a technical
result that relates the solution space of CBCT to tree-
partitions.
Lemma 8. Let P tree = {N1,N2, · · · ,Nl} be a tree-partition
of G and consider a vector b ∈ R|N | such that bj = 0 for
all j ∈ N1 and
∑
j∈Nk
bj = 0 for k 6= 1. Set
∂N1 := {j : j /∈ N1, ∃i ∈ N1 s.t. (i, j) ∈ E or (j, i) ∈ E}
and N 1 = N1 ∪ ∂N1. Then the linear system
CBCTx = b (5)
is solvable, and any solution x to (5) satisfies xi = xj for
all i, j ∈ N 1.
The set ∂N1 defined above are the “boundary” buses ofN1
in G and N 1 can be interpreted as the closure of N1. It has
a simple interpretation in the DC power flow context. Think
of b as bus injections and x as the phase angles. Suppose
the injection at every node in N1 is zero and the injections
within every other regionNk are balanced (i.e., sum to zero).
Then Lemma 8 says that the phase angles are the same at
every node in N 1, i.e., the angle difference across every
line in or incident to N1 is zero. This result only holds if
the underlying regions form a tree-partition and its proof is
presented in Appendix III.
Proof sketch of Proposition 7. For the purpose of simplified
notations, we drop the stage index (1) from x∗ and denote
x∗ = (ω∗, d∗, f∗, θ∗). To streamline the presentation, we
only sketch the main ideas of the proof here and leave the
details to Appendix II.
First, we construct a different point x˜∗ from x∗ as follows:
(i) replace d∗j with 0 for all j ∈ Nl; (ii) replace f
∗
e with 0
for e ∈ E that have both endpoints in Nl; and (iii) replace
θ∗ by a solution θ˜∗ obtained from solving DC power flow
equations with injections specified by d˜. Since cj(·) attains
its minimum at 0, x˜∗ achieves at least the same objective
value (4a) as x∗. Thus x˜∗ must be an optimal point of (4),
provided it is feasible.
Second, as the core step in the whole proof, we apply
Lemma 8 to all regions of P tree separately, and show that θ˜∗
is consistent with the injections and branch flows specified
by x˜∗. This together with routine checks allows us to prove
the feasibility of the point x˜∗.
Finally, when the cost functions cj(·) are strictly convex,
the optimal solution to (4) is unique in d∗ and f∗ (θ∗ is
also unique up to a constant shift). We thus conclude that
x˜∗ = x∗ (up to a constant shift on θ). This completes the
proof.
This result reveals that, with the proposed control strategy,
when the system converges to equilibrium after a non-
critical failure, the injections and power flows in the non-
associated regions remain unchanged. In other words, our
control scheme guarantees that non-critical failures in a
control area do not impact the operations of other areas at
all, achieving a stronger control area independence than that
ensured by the zero control error requirement.
Unlike the scheme in [19], bridge failures in the proposed
control strategy are treated in exactly the same way as other
lines, provided that they are non-critical. Furthermore, the
impact of such bridge failures is localized to the associated
regions. This contrast with the global impact of bridge
failures in [19] demonstrates again the benefits of connecting
UC to tree-partitions.
VI. CONTROLLING CRITICAL FAILURES
We now consider the case where the initial failure is criti-
cal. This may happen when a major generator or transmission
line is disconnected from the grid.
A. Unified Controller under Critical Failures
Since UC is a concept that emerged from the frequency
regulation literature, the underlying optimization (4) is al-
ways assumed to be feasible in existing studies [22], [23].
As such, little is known about the behaviors of UC if this
assumption is violated, which is the case when a critical
failure happens. We now derive a result that closes this gap
and characterizes the limiting behavior of UC in this setting.
In order to do so, we first need to formulate the ex-
act controller dynamics of UC. Unfortunately, there is no
standard way to do so as multiple designs of UC have
been proposed in the literature [20]–[23], each with its own
strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, all of the proposed
controller design are (approximately) projected primal-dual
algorithms to solve the underlying optimization (4), and
satisfy the following assumptions:
UC1: For all j ∈ N , dj ≤ dj(t) ≤ dj is satisifed for all t.
This is achieved either via a projection operator that maps
dj(t) to this interval, or by requiring the cost function cj(·)
to approach infinity near these boundaries.
UC2: Dual variables are introduced for constraints (4b)-(4e)
and maintained throughout the operation (denote these dual
variables by λi for i ∈
{
1, 2, · · · , |N |+ 3 |E|+
∣∣PUC∣∣}).
UC3: The primal variables f, θ and the dual variables λi are
updated by a primal-dual algorithm6 to solve (4).
Proposition 9. Assume UC1-UC3 hold. If (4) is infeasible,
then there exists a dual variable λi such that:
lim sup
t→∞
|λi(t)| =∞
This result implies that after a critical failure, UC cannot
drive the system to a proper and safe operating point. In
6We do not consider the specific variants of the standard primal-dual
algorithms that are proposed in different designs of UC, since the standard
primal-dual algorithm is often a good approximation.
fact, it always leads to instability in the system (certain dual
variables can take arbitrarily large values). This drawback,
however, when viewed from a different perspective, suggests
a way to detect critical failures. More specifically, since
Proposition 9 guarantees certain dual variables will become
arbitrarily large in UC operation when (4) is infeasible,
we can always set a threshold for the dual variables and
raise an infeasibility warning if some of them exceed the
corresponding thresholds. By doing so, critical failures can
always be detected, and this happens in a distributed fashion
in parallel to the normal operation of UC. Moreover, by
setting tighter thresholds around the normal operating point,
such failures can be detected more promptly.
Of course, this method is subject to false alarms since non-
critical failures may also cause relatively large dual variable
values in transient state. There is an intrinsic tradeoff on the
level of the thresholds to be applied, in the following sense:
A tighter threshold allows critical failures to be detected
more promptly, yet also leads to a larger false alarm rate.
In practice, these thresholds should be chosen carefully by
the operator in accordance to the specific system parameters
and application scenarios.
B. Constraint Lifting as a Remedy
In the event of a critical failure, it is physically impossible
for UC to simultaneously achieve all of its control objectives.
Our discussion in the last subsection shows that, if UC still
operates following its normal dynamics, the system is subject
to instability and thus successive failures. In the worst case,
this can lead to large scale outages.
We can prevent this from happening by lifting certain con-
straints from UC. Without compromising the basic objective
to stabilize the system, there are two ways to do so:
• The zero area control error constraints (4d) between cer-
tain control areas can be lifted. This in practice means
the controller now gets more control areas involved to
mitigate the failure.
• Certain load shedding can be applied, which in (4)
is reflected by enlarging the range [dj , dj ] for the
corresponding load buses.
By iteratively lifting the two types of constraints above,
one can guarantee the feasibility of (4) and ensure the system
under the proposed control converge to a stable point, which
in particular is free from successive failures. This, however,
comes with the cost of potential load loss, and thus must
be carried out properly. In practice, the iterative relaxation
procedure can follow predetermined rules specified by the
system operator to prioritize different objectives.
VII. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed control strategy on the IEEE 118-bus test system,
which comprises of two control areas as shown in Fig. 5.
The three dashed lines (15, 33), (19, 34) and (23, 24) are
switched off whenever a tree-partition needs to be formed,
and the new topology is referred to as the revised network.
The failure scenarios to be examined are created as
follows. First, we generate 100 load injections by adding
random perturbations (up to 25% of the base value) to the
nominal load profile from [28] and then solve the DC OPF to
obtain the corresponding generator operating points. Second,
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we iterate over every transmission line in the IEEE 118-
bus test system as initial failures and simulate the cascading
process thus triggered. This produces about 18,000 scenarios.
A. N − 1 Security
We first evaluate the system robustness to failures in terms
of the N − 1 security standard. In particular, we implement
both the proposed control strategy and the classical AGC [25]
on the IEEE 118-bus testbed, and look at the average number
of vulnerable lines across all the scenarios that lead to either
successive failures or load shedding when they are tripped. In
order to illustrate the improvements of the proposed control
strategy in different levels of system congestion, we scale
down the transmission line capacities to α = 0.9, 0.8, 0.7
of the base values and collect statistics on the number of
vulnerable lines in all these settings.
Our results are summarized in Fig. 6. It can be seen that
the proposed control incurs far less number of vulnerable
lines in all cases compared to AGC, and this difference is
particularly clear when the system is congested. We highlight
that this happens with the proposed control operates over the
revised network, where some of the tie-lines are switched
off and hence certain capacity is removed from the system.
Moreover, the remaining tie-line (30, 38) in the revised
network is never vulnerable under the proposed control.
B. Loss of Load and Disruption to System Operation
We now look at the load loss rate, defined as the ratio
between the total loss of load with respect to the original
total demand, of the system to evaluate how well failures are
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mitigated in different settings. In this experiment, we scale
down the generator capacities by 35% and the line capacities
by 30% so that the system is more susceptible to failures.
In order to demonstrate how UC and tree-partition impact
the system performance seperately, we look at four different
settings: (i) AGC on the original network; (ii) AGC on the
revised network; (iii) UC on the original network; and (iv)
UC on the revised network. Fig. 7 plots the complementary
cumulative distribution (CCDF) of the load loss rates across
all of the failure scenarios in these settings.
As one can see from the figure, for both the original
and revised networks, UC significantly outperforms AGC.
In particular, the largest load loss rate for UC is less than
2% for both networks, while AGC can lead to loss rate up
to 14% on the revised network and 21% on the original
network. This demonstrates the benefits of using our control
strategy to mitigate failures.
Although the performance of UC in terms of loss rate
are roughly the same with or without tree-partition, there is
a drastic difference when we look at how well the failure
impacts are localized. In Fig. 8, we plot the CCDF on the
number of generators whose operating points are adjusted in
response to the initial failures. It shows that the operation of
much fewer generators is disrupted when the control areas
that UC operates over form a tree-partition. This confirms
our intuition and theoretical results about how a tree-partition
structure helps localize failures.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a control strategy that combines
the concepts of the unified controller and the network tree-
partition to mitigate and localize cascading failures in power
system. Our case studies on the IEEE 118-bus test system
show that the proposed control scheme greatly improves
system robustness to cascading failures as compared to
classical AGC.
This work can be extended in several directions. First,
our model builds upon linearized swing and power flow
dynamics, which are accurate for small deviations but less
so under large disruptions. It is of interest to understand
how the non-linearity in more sophisticated models on large
deviations impacts our results. Second, the proposed control
strategy requires certain tie-lines to be switched off so that
a tree-partition is formed. It would be useful if the selection
of such lines can be systematically optimized under a certain
objective function. Third, both the power flow redistribution
and the line capacities are relevant in the cascading failure
dynamics. It is important to investigate how adjustments
on line capacities can be incorporated to our framework to
further improve the system reliability.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Given a bridge e = (j1, j2) of G, removing e from G
partitions G into two connected components, say C1 and C2.
Without loss of generality, assume j1 ∈ C1 and j2 ∈ C2. For a
region Nv from P , we say Nv is within C1 if for any j ∈ Nv
we have j ∈ C1. It is easy to check from the definition of
tree-partitions that any region Nv from P is either within
C1 or within C2, and e is the only edge in G that has one
endpoint in C1 and the other endpoint in C2.
Let P ′ be the set of regions within C1 from P , and put
1P′ ∈ {0, 1}
|P|
to be its characteristic vector (that is, the l-th
component of 1P′ is 1 if Nl ∈ P ′ and 0 othersize). Given
two buses i and j, we denote i→ j if (i, j) ∈ E and j → i
if (j, i) ∈ E . With such notations, from (4d), we have
0 = 1TP′ECf
∗
=
∑
l:Nl∈P′
∑
i∈Nl

∑
j:j→i
f∗ji −
∑
j:i→j
f∗ij


=
∑
i:i∈C1

∑
j:j→i
f∗ji −
∑
j:i→j
f∗ij


= f∗e +
∑
i:i∈C1

 ∑
j:j→i,j∈C1
f∗ji −
∑
j:i→j,j∈C1
f∗ij

 , (6)
where (6) is because the only edge with one endpoint in C1
and the other endpoint in C2 is e. Note that
∑
i:i∈C1

 ∑
j:j→i,j∈C1
f∗ji −
∑
j:i→j,j∈C1
f∗ij


=
∑
(i,j)∈E1
(
f∗ij − f
∗
ij
)
= 0,
where E1 is the set of edges with both endpoints in C1. From
(6), we see that f∗e = 0.
Since the bridge e is arbitrary, we have thus proved the
desired result.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
We now prove the core step as mentioned in the main
body of the paper. To simplify the notations, we drop the
stage index (1) from x∗ and denote x∗ = (ω∗, d∗, f∗, θ∗).
Put x˜∗ = (d˜∗, f˜∗, θ˜∗). From the way that x˜∗ is constructed,
the constraints (4d) are easily seen to be satisfied. If we can
show that f˜∗ = BCT θ˜∗, then since θ˜∗ is obtained by solving
the DC power flow equations from CBCT θ˜∗ = r − d˜∗, the
constraints (4b) and (4c) are also satisfied. Now we show
that f˜∗ = BCT θ˜∗ indeed holds.
To do so, we first establish the following lemma:
Lemma 10. For any tree-partition region Nz in P , we have∑
j∈Nz
(
rj − d
∗
j
)
=
∑
j∈Nz
(
rj − d˜
∗
j
)
= 0.
Proof. Let 1Nz ∈ R
|N | be the characteristic vector of Nz ,
that is, the j-th component of 1Nz is 1 if j ∈ Nz and 0
otherwise. Summing (4b) over j ∈ Nz , we have:∑
j∈Nz
(
rj − d
∗
j
)
= 1TNzCf = (ECf)z = 0,
where (ECf)z is the z-th row of ECf .
For Nz that is different from Nl, we have d˜∗j = d
∗
j for
any j ∈ Nz by construction. Thus for such Nz we also have∑
j∈Nz
(
rj − d˜
∗
j
)
= 0.
For Nl, since Nl is not associated with B(1), we have
rj = 0 for j ∈ Nl. Moreover, by construction we also know
that d˜∗j = 0 for j ∈ Nl. As a result∑
j∈Nl
(
rj − d˜
∗
j
)
= 0.
This completes the proof.
Now consider a region Nw that is different from Nl. In
this case, we do not change the injection from x∗ when
constructing x˜∗, thus d∗j − d˜
∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ Nw. From
Lemma 10, we see that
∑
j∈Nz
(
d∗j − d˜
∗
j
)
= 0 for all z.
Since d∗ and θ∗ conform to the DC power flow equations,
we have
CBCT θ∗ = r − d∗
and thus
CBCT
(
θ∗ − θ˜∗
)
= d˜∗ − d∗.
By Lemma 8, we then have θ∗j − θ˜
∗
j is a constant over Nw,
and thus
θ˜∗i − θ˜
∗
j = θ
∗
i − θ
∗
j
for all i, j ∈ Nw. This in particular implies
f˜∗e = f
∗
e = Be(θ
∗
i − θ
∗
j ) = Be(θ˜
∗
i − θ˜
∗
j )
for all e = (i, j) such that i ∈ Nw or j ∈ Nw.
Next let us consider the region Nl. In this region, we
have d˜∗j = 0 by construction. Moreover, since Nl is not
associated with B(1), we know rj = 0 for all j ∈ Nl. Thus
rj − d˜
∗
j = 0 for all j ∈ Nl. Further, from Lemma 10 we
have
∑
j∈Nz
(
rj − d˜∗j
)
= 0 for all z. Thus by Lemma 8
and CBCT θ˜∗ = r− d˜∗, we know θ˜∗i = θ˜
∗
j for all i, j ∈ N l.
This implies that for any edge e = (i, j) within Nl, we have
f˜∗e = 0 = Be(θ˜
∗
i − θ˜
∗
j ).
As a result, we see that f˜∗e = Be(θ˜
∗
i − θ˜
∗
j ) holds for all
e ∈ E . This completes the proof.
APPENDIX III
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It is well-known that the Laplacian matrix L := CBCT
of a connected graph G = (N , E) has rank |N | − 1, and
Lx = b is solvable if and only if 1T b = 0, where 1 is
the vector with a proper dimension that consists of ones.
Moreover, the kernel of L is given by span(1).
If N1 is the only region in P , then b = 0 since bj = 0 for
all j ∈ N1. We thus know the solution space to Lx = b is
exactly the kernel of L, and the desired result holds.
If N1 is not the only region in P , we can then find a
bus that does not belong to N1, say bus z. Without loss
of generality, assume the bus z ∈ Nk. Consider a solution
x to Lx = b. Since the kernel of L is span(1), we can
without loss of generality assume the last component of x
is 0. Let L be the submatrix of L obtained by removing its
last row and last column, and similarly let x and b be the
vectors obtained by removing the last component of x and
b, respectively. Then L is invertible (since it is a principal
submatrix, see [18]), and we have
Lx = b.
Denote the matrix obtained by deleting the l-th row and
i-th column of L by L
li
, then Proposition V.2 of [18] shows
that
det
(
L
li
)
= (−1)l+i
∑
E∈T ({l,i},{z})
χ(E), (7)
where χ(E) =
∏
e∈E Be and T ({l, i} , {z}) is the set of
spanning forests of G that consists of exactly two trees
containing {l, i} and {z} respectively. We refer the readers
to [18] for a detailed discussion on how to interpret these
notations.
To state some useful results derived from (7), we introduce
the following definition of directly connected regions.
Definition 11. For a tree-partition P = {N1,N2, · · · ,Nk}
of G, we say Nv and Nw are directly connected without
Nl if the path from Nv to Nw in GP does not contain Nl.
The path from Nv to Nw in the above definition is unique
since GP forms a tree. As an example, in Fig. 3, N1 and N2
are directly connected without N3, yet N2 and N3 are not
directly connected without N1.
In the following proofs, we need to refer to paths in both
the original graph G and the reduced graph GP . To clear
potential confusions, we agree the following terminologies:
Given two sets of nodes Nv and Nw (that can be different
from the tree-partition regions in P) of G, a path in G from
Nv to Nw refers to a path consisting of nodes (and lines)
from the original graph G whose starting node belongs to
Nv and ending node belongs to Nw. Given two tree-partition
regions Nv and Nw, a path in GP from Nv to Nw refers to a
path consisting of nodes (and lines) from the reduced graph
GP whose starting node is Nv and ending node is Nw. Since
there is a natural correspondance between bridges in G and
lines in GP , if a line e in GP is contained in a path P in GP ,
we also say the corresponding bridge e˜ from G is contained
in P .
Lemma 12. Assume N2 and Nk are not directly connected
without N1. If l1, l2 ∈ N2 and i ∈ N 1, then
T ({l1, i} , {z}) = T ({l2, i} , {z}).
Proof. The path from N1 to Nk in GP contains a bridge in
G that incidents to N1. Denote this bridge as e˜ and let w be
the endpoint of e˜ that is not in N1. Then it is easy to check
that w is a cut node that any path from N 1 to N2 in G must
contain.
Since N2 and Nk are not directly connected without N1,
the path from N2 to Nk in GP passes through N1. In other
words, any path in G from N2 to Nk must pass through a
certain node in N1, and thus contains a sub-path in G from
N1 to Nk. This implies that w is contained in any path in G
from N2 to Nk.
Note that any tree containing i ∈ N 1 and l1 ∈ N2 induces
a path in G from N 1 to N2 and thus contains w. Further, any
tree containing l2 ∈ N2 and z ∈ Nk induces a path from N2
to Nk in G, and thus also contains w. As a result, these two
types of trees always share a common node w and cannot
be disjoint:
T ({l1, i} , {l2, z}) = ∅.
Similarly T ({l2, i} , {l1, z}) = ∅. Therefore
T ({l1, i} , {z})
= T ({l1, l2, i} , {z}) ⊔ T ({l1, i} , {l2, z})
= T ({l1, l2, i} , {z}) ⊔ T ({l2, i} , {l1, z})
= T ({l2, i} , {z}),
where ⊔ means disjoint union. The desired result then
follows.
Lemma 13. Assume N2 and Nk are directly connected
without N1. If l ∈ N2 and i1, i2 ∈ N1, then
T ({l, i1} , {z}) = T ({l, i2} , {z}).
Proof. The path from N1 to Nk in GP (denoted as P1)
contains a bridge in G that incidents to N1. Denote this
bridge as e˜ and let w be the endpoint of e˜ that does not
belong to N1. Then it is easy to check that w is a cut node
that any path in G from N 1 to Nk must pass through.
We claim that if N2 and Nk are directly conncted without
N1, then any path from N 1 to N2 in G must also contain
w. Indeed, suppose not, then the path from N1 to N2 in GP
(denoted as P2) contains a bridge in G that incidents to N1,
and this bridge is different from e˜. If P1 and P2 do not have
any common super nodes, then concatenating the two paths
induces a path in GP from N2 to Nk that passes through
N1. In other words, the path from N2 to Nk in GP passes
through N1, contradicting the assumption that N2 and Nk
are directly connected without N1. Therefore, P1 and P2
share a common node, say N3. However, P1 and P2 induce
two different sub-paths in GP from N1 to N3, contracting
the assumption that GP forms a tree. We thus have proved
the claim.
Finally, note that any tree containing i1 ∈ N 1 and l ∈ N2
induces a path in G from N 1 to N2 and thus contains w.
Further, any tree containing i2 ∈ N 1 and z ∈ Nk induces
a path in G from N 1 to Nk and thus contains w. Therefore
these two types of trees always share a common node w and
cannot be disjoint:
T ({l, i1} , {i2, z}) = ∅.
Similarly T ({l, i2} , {i1, z}) = ∅. As a result,
T ({l, i1} , {z})
= T ({l, i1, i2} , {z}) ⊔ T ({l, i1} , {i2, z})
= T ({l, i1, i2} , {z})
= T ({l, i1, i2} , {z}) ⊔ T ({l, i2} , {i1, z})
= T ({l, i2} , {z}).
Now since bk = bk = 0 for all k ∈ N1, by Cramer’s rule,
we have
xi = xi =
∑
l/∈N1
(−1)l+ibk det
(
L
li
)
det
(
L
) (8)
for all i.
Let P1 be set of the regions in P that are directly
connected to Nk without N1 and let P2 be the remaining
regions. For a region Nl ∈ P1, let
χ(Nl) :=
∑
E∈T ({l˜,i},{z})
χ(E),
where l˜ is an arbitrary bus in Nl. χ(Nl) is well-defined by
Lemma 12. This together with the assumption
∑
j∈Nl
bj = 0
then implies∑
l∈Nl
(−1)l+ibl det
(
L
li
)
=
∑
l∈Nl
bl

 ∑
E∈T ({l,i},{z})
χ(E)

 = ∑
l∈Nl
blχ(Nl)
= χ(Nl)
∑
l∈Nl
bl
= 0.
As a result∑
l/∈N1
(−1)l+ibl det
(
L
li
)
=
∑
Nl∈P1
∑
l∈Nl
(−1)l+ibl det
(
L
li
)
+
∑
Nl∈P2
∑
l∈Nl
(−1)l+ibl det
(
L
li
)
=
∑
Nl∈P2
∑
l∈Nl
(−1)l+ibl det
(
L
li
)
=
∑
Nl∈P2
∑
l∈Nl
bl

 ∑
E∈T ({l,i},{z})
χ(E)

 ,
which by Lemma 13 takes the same value for all i ∈ N 1.
In other words, the equation (8) takes the same value for all
i ∈ N 1. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
Frist, let us put x = [f, d, θ] ∈ R2|N |+|E| to collect all the
decision variables of the UC optimization (4) and rewrite it
to a more generic form:
min
d≤d≤d
c(d) (9a)
s.t. Ax ≤ g (9b)
Cx = h, (9c)
where A,C, g, h are matrices (vectors) of proper dimensions
from the optimization (4). Let λ1, λ2 be the corresponding
dual variables to (9b) and (9c) respectively and λ := [λ1;λ2]
([·; ·] here means matrix concatenation as a column), we can
then write the Lagrangian for (9) as
L(x, λ) = c(d) + λT1 (Ax− g) + λ
T
2 (Cx − h).
Now by the assumption UC3, we know that:
λ˙1 = [Ax − g]
+
λ1
(10a)
λ˙2 = Cx− h, (10b)
where the projection operator [·]+λ1 is defined component-
wise by
([x]+λ1 )i :=
{
xi if xi > 0 or λ1,i > 0
0 otherwise.
(11)
Consider two closed convex sets S1 = {x|Ax ≤ g, Cx =
h} and S2 = {x|d ≤ d ≤ d}. If the optimization (4) is
infeasible, then S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, i.e., the sets S1 and S2 are
disjoint. As a result, there exists a hyperplane that separates
S1 and S2: ∃p ∈ R2|N |+|E|, q ∈ R such that
pTx > q, ∀x ∈ S1 and p
Tx ≤ q, ∀x ∈ S2.
This then implies the system

Ax ≤ g
Cx = h
pTx ≤ q
is not solvable. By Farkas’ Lemma, we can then find
w1, w2, w3 of proper dimensions such that w1 ≥ 0, w3 ≥ 0,
ATw1+C
Tw2+pw3 = 0, and g
Tw1+h
Tw2+qw3 = ǫ < 0.
Define z = [w1;w2]. We then see that under the UC
controller, we have for any t:
zT λ˙(t) = wT1 [Ax(t) − g]
+
λ + w
T
2 (Cx(t) − h)
≥ wT1 [Ax(t) − g]
+
λ + w
T
2 (Cx(t) − h)
+w3(p
Tx(t)− q) (12a)
≥ wT1 (Ax(t) − g) + w
T
2 (Cx(t) − h)
+w3(p
Tx(t)− q) (12b)
=
(
ATw1 + C
Tw2 + pw3
)
x(t)
−
(
wT1 g + w
T
2 h+ w3q
)
= 0− ǫ
> 0,
where (12a) comes from w3 ≥ 0 and the assumption UC1,
which ensures x(t) ∈ S2 and thus pTx(t)−q ≤ 0, and (12b)
comes from w1 ≥ 0 and the fact that [x]
+
λ ≥ x for all x (the
inequality is component-wise).
As a result, we see that
zTλ(t)− zTλ(0) > −ǫt
and thus
lim
t→∞
zTλ(t) =∞.
Finally, by noting
lim
t→∞
zTλ(t) ≤ wT1 lim sup
t→∞
|λ1(t)|+ |w2|
T
lim sup
t→∞
|λ2(t)| ,
the desired result follows.
